Bankruptcy by Wielebinski, Joseph J. & Rukavina, Davor
SMU Law Review





Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation






I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 878
II. ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM/EXECUTORY
CONTRACTS ............................................ 878
A. MEREDITH CORPORATION V. HOME INTERIORS &
GIFTS, INC. (IN RE HOME INTERIORS & GIFTS, INC.) .. 878
III. ASSET SALES/STAMP TAX EXEMPTION ............. 880
A. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE V. PICCADILLY
CAFETERIAS, INC. ...................................... 880
IV. ATTORNEYS/BAPCPA .................................. 881
A. HERSH V. UNITED STATES ............................ 881
B. IN RE HENDERSON .................................... 884
C. CAPLIN & DRYSDALE CHARTERED V. BABCOCK &
WILCOX Co. (IN RE BABCOCK & WILCOX Co.) ....... 884
D. KAYE V. HUGHES & LUCE, LLP (IN RE GADZOOKS
IN C.) . .................................................. 886
V. AUTOMATIC STAY ..................................... 887
A. CAMPBELL V. COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC. ...... 887
B. REPINE V. REPINE (IN RE REPINE) .................... 888
C. IN RE MD PROMENADE, INC. .......................... 889
VI. CHAPTER 11 PLANS .................................... 890
A. ELIXIR INDUSTRIES INC. V. CITY BANK & TRUST CO.
(IN RE AHERN ENTERPRISES INC.) .................... 890
VII. CORE/NON-CORE PROCEEDINGS .................... 892
A. BEITEL V. OCA, INC. (IN RE OCA, INC.) ............. 892
VIII. CREDITORS MEETING ................................. 893
A. PERES V. SHERMAN (IN RE PERES) .................... 893
IX. DEFAULT JUDGMENTS ................................ 894
A. BEITEL V. OCA INC. (IN RE OCA, INC.) .............. 894
X. DEEPENING INSOLVENCY ............................ 894
A. WOOLEY V. FAULKNER (IN RE SI RESTRUCTURING,
IN C.) . .................................................. 894
XI. EXEM PTIONS ........................................... 895
* Joseph J. Wielebinski is a shareholder in the Insolvency, Restructuring & Credi-
tors' Rights practice group at Munsch Hardt Kopf & Harr, P.C. in Dallas, Texas.
** Davor Rukavina is a shareholder in the Insolvency, Restructuring & Creditors'
Rights practice group at Munsch Hardt Kopf & Harr, P.C. in Dallas, Texas.
The authors acknowledge the editorial assistance of Leslie P. Fisher.
SMU LAW REVIEW
A. SOZA V. HILL (IN RE SOZA) ........................... 895
B. WALLACE V. ROGERS (IN RE ROGERS) ................ 896
XII. POST-PETITION ATI1ORNEY'S FEES .................. 898
A. TRAVELERS CASUALTY & SURETY CO. OF AMERICA V.
PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC Co ......................... 898
XIII. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE .......................... 899
A. REED V. RABE (IN RE GROTJOHN) .................... 899
B. HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LP v.
CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORP. (IN RE SEVEN SEAS
PETROLEUM, INC.) .................................... 900
XIV, SANCTIONS-RULE 11 ................................. 902
A. THE CADLE CO. v. PRATT (IN RE PRATT) ............. 902
B. IN RE SUGAR HILL RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT,
IN C. .................................................... 903
I. INTRODUCTION
A N increasing amount of activity involving bankruptcy and related
commercial law matters occurred during the Survey pe-
riod. Perhaps the most important development was the ruling by
the United States Supreme Court in the Florida Department of Revenue
v. Piccadilly Cafeterias matter, discussed in Section III.A. in-
fra, which announced the correct application to the stamp tax exemption
contained in section 1146(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code). The
Fifth Circuit and Texas bankruptcy and district courts issued a wide vari-
ety of bankruptcy decisions. Many of those decisions, however, were
fact-specific or did not otherwise represent a significant development in
bankruptcy law. The authors have attempted to assemble a wide variety
of cases whose legal holdings will impact bankruptcy practice and which
will therefore have significance beyond the particular opinion. Based on
their practice and experience, the authors believe that the cases presented
should be relevant to the bankruptcy practitioner and worth remember-
ing. Many of these cases are interesting even apart from their legal impli-
cations. With the challenging economy and the record number of
bankruptcy filings in 2009, the authors anticipate that over the next year
there will be substantially more decisions having even broader im-
pact and wider scope.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM/EXECUTORY CONTRACTS
A. MEREDITH CORPORATION V. HOME INTERIORS & GIFTS, INC.
(IN RE HOME INTERIORS & GIFTS, INC.)
In In re Home Interiors, the debtor rejected an executory contract for
intellectual property rights but continued to use the rejected marks and
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associated rights after the rejection.1 The court faced the issue of
whether the creditor was entitled to an administrative claim even though
all conditions necessary for the debtor's use of the marks were completed
pre-petition, meaning that there was no post-petition inducement.2 The
court ultimately found: (1) that the creditor was entitled to an administra-
tive claim because of the debtor's post-petition use of the marks, and (2)
an over-emphasis on post-petition inducement was misplaced in the
trademark licensing scenario.3 The court also concluded that the measure
of the administrative claim would be the contract rate, as the debtor
failed to provide sufficient evidence that the contract rate was not the fair
market value rate.4
The debtor sold home d6cor products through a network of design con-
sultants who hosted in-home parties.5 The parties executed a pre-peti-
tion, long-term executory license agreement that permitted use of the
creditor's trademarks in connection with the debtor's products in ex-
change for royalties payable to the creditor. The debtor rejected the con-
tract approximately six weeks after the petition date. The creditor
thereafter sought the allowance of an administrative expense claim for
the debtor's post-petition usage and sale of products bearing the credi-
tor's marks. The creditor never sought relief from the automatic stay to
terminate the license agreement. The creditor sought an administrative
claim for two periods: (1) the post-petition, but pre-rejection period, and
(2) the post-petition, post-rejection period (prior to the next quarterly
catalog). 6 The issue before the court was whether the claim in question
was simply a contract rejection claim, or if a post-petition component en-
titled the creditor to an administrative claim.7
The court noted that in order for a claim to be entitled to administra-
tive priority under section 503(b) of the Code, the "claim against the es-
tate must have arisen post-petition and as a result of actions taken by the
trustee that benefitted the estate."'8 The claim must have arisen from a
transaction with the estate, as opposed to one merely with the pre-peti-
tion debtor, and, in this respect, "the proper focus [is] on the inducement
involved in causing the creditor to part with its goods or services."9 The
court quoted, with approval, a holding from the Sixth Circuit to the effect
that "[a] creditor provides consideration to the bankruptcy estate only
when the debtor-in possession [sic] induces the creditor's perform-
ance.... If the inducement came from a pre-petition debtor, then consid-
1. Meredith Corp. v. Home Interiors & Gifts, Inc. (In re Home Interiors & Gifts,
Inc.), No. 09-31961-11-BJH, 2008 WL 4772102, at *1-3 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2008).
2. Id.
3. Id. at *6-7.
4. Id. at *11-12.
5. Id. at *1.
6. Id. at *3.
7. Id. at *1.
8. Id. at *4 (quoting In re Jack/Wade Drilling, Inc., 258 F.3d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 2001)).
9. Id. (quoting United Trucking Serv., Inc. v. Trailer Rental Co. (In re United Truck-
ing Serv., Inc.), 851 F.2d 159, 162 (6th Cir. 1988)).
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eration was given to that entity rather than to the debtor-in-
possession."' 10
The goods bearing the creditor's marks were manufactured, marketed,
and approved by the creditor pre-petition. However, they were sold post-
petition, and the proceeds benefited the estate. Accordingly, the court
held that the "focus on post-petition 'inducement' is misplaced in a trade-
mark use context," because the debtor used the marks post-petition as a
result of the debtor's actions and for the benefit of the estate." Further-
more, "[tihe actual date of product approval or physical production of
marketing materials is not the relevant inquiry in the context of the post-
petition use of a trademark. ' 12 Instead, "the true value of a trademark
comes from its public use, and in a trademark context, this Court con-
cludes that 'use' can be succinctly defined as a continuous introduction of
the mark into the stream of commerce.' 3 In essence, the debtor contin-
ued to benefit from the use of the marks post-petition and, just as where a
debtor uses leased property post-petition, an administrative claim may be
awarded without exclusive post-petition inducement. 14
The court found that, after rejection, the size of the administrative
claim is determined by the fair market value of the property or right used
by the estate.' 5 However, "[a]lthough the contract rate is no longer appli-
cable per se in the post-rejection period, courts invariably look to the
rates negotiated by the parties in the contract to determine the fair mar-
ket value of the debtor's continued use of the contracted-for property.' 16
Thus, although the appropriate rate is the fair market value rate, "the
contract rate is presumed to be the fair rental value" absent evidence by
the debtor to the contrary.17 In this case, the debtor failed to provide
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that the contract rate was
the fair market rate.
III. ASSET SALES/STAMP TAX EXEMPTION
A. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE V.
PICCADILLY CAFETERIAS, INC.
In Piccadilly Cafeterias, a significant decision that will affect Chapter 11
practice across several circuits, the U.S. Supreme Court definitively ad-
dressed the availability of the tax stamp exemption afforded by section
10. Id. at *5 (quoting Employee Transfer Corp. v. Grigsby (In re White Motor Corp.),




14. Id. at *6.





1146(a)18 of the Code (formerly section 1146(c)).1 9 At bar was the issue
of whether the operative phrase-"under a plan confirmed"-required
the actual confirmation of a plan and the effectuation of the sale through
the plan. The Court concluded that the statute means what it says, and
the section 1146(a) exemption applies only to a sale actually effectuated
under a confirmed plan.20
Before Piccadilly Cafeterias, the practice in many courts was to invoke
the tax stamp exemption with respect to a sale under section 363 of the
Code outside a plan, even when there was no plan on file, under the the-
ory that a sale would not be completed until the proceeds were distrib-
uted, which would occur through a plan.21 The Piccadilly Cafeterias
debtor argued that the exemption should apply even though the sale was
effectuated prior to the filing of the plan, because the plan, which enacted
various settlements, would determine the distribution of the sale
proceeds. 22
In rejecting this argument, the Court reviewed relevant precedent, con-
sidered the purposes of the Code, and applied cannons of statutory inter-
pretation to conclude that the section "affords a stamp-tax exemption
only to transfers made pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan that has been con-
firmed. ' '23 Of additional interest-and of potential application to other
ambiguities under the Code-the Court noted that section 1146 was lo-
cated in the section of the Code labeled Postconfirmation Matters,
thereby further evidencing congressional intent that the sale must be ef-
fectuated under the plan itself.2 4 Absent action by Congress, the Su-
preme Court put this issue to rest; but the effect on Texas practice, given
Texas' substantially different bulk sale statutes, may not prove significant.
IV. ATTORNEYS/BAPCPA
A. HERSH V. UNITED STATES
The Fifth Circuit in Hersh held that attorneys may qualify as "debt re-
lief agencies" under certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Preven-
tion and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA).25 Section 526(a)(4) of
the Code, enacted as a result of BAPCPA, prohibits a "debt relief
agency" from advising:
18. The statute provides that "[t]he issuance, transfer, or exchange of a security, or the
making or delivery of an instrument of transfer under a plan confirmed under section 1129
of this title, may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax." 11 U.S.C.
§ 1146(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
19. Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2326, 2329 (2008).
20. Id. at 2339.
21. Id. at 2330-31 n.2.
22. Id. at 2330-32. The Eleventh Circuit agreed, holding that the "tax exemption may
apply to those pre-confirmation transfers that are necessary to the consummation of a con-
firmed plan of reorganization, which, at the very least, requires that there be some nexus
between the pre-confirmation transfer and the confirmed plan." Id. at 2331.
23. Id. at 2339.
24. Id. at 2336.
25. Hersh v. United States, 553 F.3d 743, 749 (5th Cir. 2008).
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an assisted person or prospective assisted person to incur more debt
in contemplation of such person filing a case under this title or to pay
an attorney or bankruptcy petition preparer fee or charge for ser-
vices performed as part of preparing for or representing a debtor in a
case under this title.2 6
The circuit court also addressed section 527(b) of the Code,27 which re-
quires a "debt relief agency" to provide certain information to the pro-
spective debtor.2 8 The district court agreed with Hersh's argument that,
by restricting the advice she could give to clients contemplating bank-
ruptcy, section 526(a)(4) of the Code violated First Amendment free
speech protections.29
The Fifth Circuit applied the plain meaning of the BAPCPA to con-
clude that attorneys fall within the concept of "debt relief agency" as
"any person who provides any bankruptcy assistance to an assisted per-
son in return for the payment of money or other valuable considera-
tion."' 30 The circuit court also noted that the legislative history indicates
that Congress intended the act to apply to attorneys in order to address
what was perceived as potential abuse by some attorneys, in addition to
such abuse by debtors.3 1 Thus, both the express language of the statute
and its legislative history confirm that the definition of "debt relief
agency" does include attorneys, if they fall within the definition.32
The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court's finding of unconstitutional-
ity with respect to section 526(a)(4) of the Code.33 It noted the availabil-
ity of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, or "where an otherwise
acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems un-
less such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress. '34
With respect to section 526(a)(4) of the Code, there were admitted con-
stitutionally valid situations in which Congress could regulate speech
without violating the First Amendment, such as in preventing abuse and
by protecting honest debtors whose discharge might be denied as a result
of a prohibited action.35 Moreover, if a debtor incurs debt knowing that
he either cannot or will not pay, such an action may amount to fraud.36
In these circumstances, section 526(a)(4) of the Code would pass consti-
tutional muster.3 7 However, the question was whether section 526(a)(4)
was overbroad, encompassing situations lacking abusive or fraudulent in-
26. 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2006).
27. Hersh, 553 F.3d at 749.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 527(b).
29. Hersh, 553 F.3d at 749.
30. Id. at 750 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A)).
31. Id. at 751.
32. Id. at 750-51.
33. Id. at 746.
34. Id. at 753-54.
35. Id. at 754-55.
36. Id. at 755.
37. Id. at 755-56.
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tent, in which case the regulated speech would be constitutionally
protected. 38
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the doctrine of constitutional avoid-
ance provides a sufficient remedy.39 Since the statute was not facially
unconstitutional, reading the statute as prohibiting speech that the gov-
ernment could prohibit, but not seeking to prohibit speech that was con-
stitutional, meant that the statute passed constitutional muster.40 It
should be noted that the circuit court more than once recognized that: (1)
the attorney was not contemplating violating the statute in bad faith; (2)
only civil damages against the attorney were available to the client for a
violation of the statute; and (3) there was no evidence that the govern-
ment was enforcing, or was about to enforce, the statute against the attor-
ney or other similarly situated attorneys (or debtors). 41 The circuit court
might have applied a more rigid analysis had the statute been enforced
through a punitive mechanism, given the harsher potential consequences
in that circumstance of an erroneous belief that the statute did not apply.
With respect to the issue regarding section 527(b) of the Code, the
court concluded that the government has a "substantially compelling" in-
terest "in ensuring that debtors who are contemplating filing for bank-
ruptcy have some basic knowledge about the process. 42 The Fifth
Circuit court noted that section 527(b) of the Code requires only that the
"debt relief agency" must provide some information to the client.43 This
does not mean that the attorney is required to provide "false and mis-
leading" information, as the attorney "is free to explain every detail of
the bankruptcy process as it applies to her client [and] may even alter the
language of the statement to fit her preferences as long as the content
remains substantially similar."44
It is difficult to tell what to make of this opinion; given the potential for
en banc or further review, the matter may very well be revisited. It is
somewhat disconcerting that the government may prohibit an attorney
from providing certain otherwise lawful advice to a debtor and that it
may require the attorney to make (or not make) certain statements to the
debtor. On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit narrowly construed the pro-
hibition to situations where most would likely agree that it would be inap-
propriate to incur new debt on the eve of a filing. Moreover, the
information required to be provided by section 527(b) of the Code is just
information, of an apparently harmless nature, designed to address the
38. Id. at 756. For example, it may well be in the interest of everyone involved in the
situation, and therefore not abusive or wrongful, for a particular debtor to refinance his
homestead at a lower rate on the eve of bankruptcy. Id. at 753. Section 526(a)(4) of the
Code would limit the advice that could be given to this debtor despite the legitimate and
helpful purpose of that advice. See 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2006).
39. Hersh, 553 F.3d at 756.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 748.
42. Id. at 766.
43. Id. at 767-68 (internal quotations omitted).
44. Id. at 767.
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problem among certain debtor lawyers who are perceived as being unre-
sponsive to the client. The potential concern with Hersh is therefore not
necessarily the facts before it, but rather the potential for a slippery slope
with the government dictating more in the future about what advice can
or cannot be given to a client in contemplation of a bankruptcy filing.
B. IN RE HENDERSON
At first blush, the issue in In re Henderson -whether the death of the
debtor excuses the completion of a financial management course required
to obtain a discharge45-may seem ridiculous and the result obvious.
However, the death of a debtor during a case is specifically addressed in
the Bankruptcy Rules,46 and there may be good reasons for exemptions
and the discharge of debt notwithstanding the death. BAPCPA requires
that a debtor complete a financial management course and that the fail-
ure to do so may be grounds for the denial of discharge. 47 But what if the
debtor dies before completing one?
The court did not struggle to reach the conclusion that the debtor's
death legitimately excused literal compliance with the financial manage-
ment requirement.48 As held by the In re Henderson court,
[i]f the debtor is "disabled" within the meaning of section 109(h)(4),
then the debtor is excused from the requirement ... [t]he statutory
language (added in 2005) seems not to have anticipated the possibil-
ity that debtor might die after filing but before completing the man-
dated instructional course. Still, the intent of Congress seems
obvious at least from its context, if not from its express wording.49
Although the importance of this opinion appears to be limited to its facts,
it may be of significance in those cases where the debtor dies during the
pendency of a case and prior to fulfilling one of a host of bankruptcy
requirements.
C. CAPLIN & DRYSDALE CHARTERED V. BABCOCK & WILCOX CO.
(IN RE BABCOCK & WILCOX CO.)
The Fifth Circuit in In re Babcock & Wilcox concluded that the bank-
ruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by awarding non-working travel
time at fifty percent of the hourly rate.50 The bankruptcy court previ-
ously approved the employment of the law firm as counsel for the asbes-
tos claimants' committee, meaning that the firm was to be paid and
reimbursed for expenses from the estate, subject to allowance under sec-
45. In re Henderson, No. 06-52439-C, 2008 WL 1740529, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
2008).
46. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1016.
47. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(11) (2006).
48. In re Henderson, 2008 WL 1740529, at *1.
49. Id.
50. Caplin & Drysdale Chartered v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (In re Babcock & Wilcox
Co.), 526 F.3d 824, 826 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curium).
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tion 330 of the Code.51 The firm requested the allowance of fees for the
travel time of its attorneys at the full hourly rate of the attorneys.52 The
United States Trustee objected, and the bankruptcy court ultimately
awarded attorney's fees at fifty percent of the full hourly rate for non-
working travel time.53
The Fifth Circuit noted that a bankruptcy court's award of attorney's
fees is reviewed for abuse of discretion and that "[a] bankruptcy court
abuses its discretion when it: (1) applies an improper legal standard or
follows improper procedures in calculating the fee award; or (2) rests its
decision on findings of fact that are clearly erroneous. '54 The circuit
court also acknowledged that the claimant bears the burden of proving
the reasonableness of compensation under section 330 of the Code.5 5 At
the same time, however, the Fifth Circuit recognized the principles em-
bodied in the Code that estate professionals should be compensated the
same in bankruptcy as they would outside of bankruptcy in order to re-
tain the most capable counsel. 56
In affirming the bankruptcy court's decision, the Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that "there is not a consensus regarding the billing of travel time
under [section] 330." 57 In analogous situations, non-working travel time
had been awarded at fifty percent while certain bankruptcy courts had
awarded such time at one hundred percent.5 8 With respect to the law
firm's evidentiary burden, the circuit court agreed that the firm failed to
present a sufficient factual showing of the firm's billing practice related to
comparable firms.5 9 Accordingly, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its
discretion. 60
In the end, because the circuit court only held that the bankruptcy
court did not abuse its discretion, In re Babcock & Wilcox is neither re-
markable nor likely to change regular practice. 61 The holding is not that
non-working travel time must be paid at fifty percent of standard rate, or
that it cannot be paid at one hundred percent. This would have been the
issue had the law firm made the required evidentiary showing regarding
customary and ordinary billing practices for New York City attorneys.
Therefore, this ultimate question must await a future ruling.62 It seems
51. Id. at 826-27.
52. Id. at 826.
53. Id.
54. Id. (quoting In re Cahill, 428 F.3d 536, 539 (5th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotations
omitted).
55. Id. at 827.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 828.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 827.
60. Id. at 826, 829.
61. In the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, for ex-
ample, local standing orders provide that non-working travel time is usually payable at fifty
percent of the full hourly rate. BANKR. N.D. TEX. GEN. ORDER 2006-02, GUIDELINES FOR
COMP. & EXPENSE REIMBURSEMENT OF PROF'LS I II.G. (2006).
62. See Babcock & Wilcox Co., 526 F.3d at 828-29.
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unlikely that the Fifth Circuit will issue a per se holding that non-working
travel time must be compensated at a specific rate, for multiple reasons,
including the discretion allowed the bankruptcy courts to interpret the
facts at hand, the language of section 330 of the Code, and the potential
for abuse.
D. KAYE V. HUGHES & LUCE, LLP (IN RE GADZOOKS INC.)
This important case is analyzed in this article so that professionals will
remain apprised of recent developments. In re Gadzooks Inc. examines
the issue of whether the allowance of attorney's fees and the reimburse-
ment of expenses under section 330 of the Code is subject to a "material
benefits" test that weighs the benefits of attorney services in hindsight.63
Hughes & Luce served as counsel for the equity committee at a time
when the bankruptcy case appeared to be one in which the equity interest
holders would receive a distribution. Ultimately, the equity interests
holders did not receive any distribution, and the question, therefore, was
whether the services of Hughes & Luce provided a benefit to the estate. 64
The bankruptcy court applied a "reasonable benefit" test and allowed
fees because, at the time that the fees were provided, they appeared rea-
sonably likely to provide a benefit.65 On the other hand, the district court
applied a "material benefits" test and reviewed the benefit of the fees in
hindsight. 66 This ruling caused quite a stir given its potentially chilling
effect on the provision of professional fees and expenses if they were to
be judged with the benefit of hindsight, especially in the many bankruptcy
cases that ultimately succeed even though, at times, success appears in
question.6 7
The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal because the district court's order
was not a final decision.68 The district court, in reversing the bankruptcy
court's legal application, remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for
further findings in light of the district court's standard. Because the
bankruptcy court was to perform a judicial, as opposed to a ministerial
function, the district court order was not "final," and the Fifth Circuit
lacked appellate jurisdiction. 69 This decision will prolong the debate over
the appropriate standard of review of fee applications and continue the
present uncertainty occasioned by the district court's opinion.
63. Kaye v. Hughes & Luce, LLP (In re Gadzooks, Inc.), 291 F. App'x 652, 653 (5th
Cir. 2008).
64. Kaye v. Hughes & Luce, LLP, No. 3:06-CV-01863-B, 2007 WL 2059724, at *1-2
(N.D. Tex. July 13, 2007).
65. Id. at *2.
66. In re Gadzooks, 291 F. App'x at 653.
67. See Kaye, 2007 WL 2059724, at *12.
68. In re Gadzooks, 291 F. App'x at 653.




A. CAMPBELL V. COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC.
Campbell addresses the issue of whether the filing of a proof of claim in
a bankruptcy case to increase the amount of post-petition escrow pay-
ments violates the automatic stay.70 Not surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit
held that the mere filing of a proof of claim in the bankruptcy case does
not violate the automatic stay.71 In a broader sense, the Fifth Circuit en-
dorsed the notion, without specifically so holding, that actions, docu-
ments, and proceedings commenced or undertaken in the bankruptcy
case cannot violate the automatic stay.72
The Chapter 13 debtors sought damages from their home mortgage
lender, Countrywide, arguing that Countrywide violated the automatic
stay by the wording of its proof of claim filed in their bankruptcy case.
Specifically, Countrywide included language that the post-petition
monthly amount for the mortgage would increase by almost $100 post-
petition on account of monthly escrow payments. 73 The debtors objected
to this portion of the proof of claim, the bankruptcy court allowed the
claim, but disallowed the increased post-petition amounts, and ultimately
the bankruptcy court confirmed a plan providing for mortgage payments
in the amount of the debtors' pre-petition payments. The debtors also
sought damages for a stay violation, arguing that the filing of this proof of
claim (or including the objectionable language) was an attempt to collect
a pre-petition claim. The bankruptcy court agreed that Countrywide's ac-
tions amounted to a willful violation of the automatic stay.74
On interlocutory appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the
bankruptcy court that, based on the Code's definition of "claim," Coun-
trywide attempted to collect a pre-petition claim by filing the proof of
claim. However, the circuit court disagreed that the filing of a proof of
claim could constitute a violation of the automatic stay. It noted that
certain categories of judicial filings and actions are specifically stayed
under section 362(a) of the Code. 75 But, the Code also specifically pro-
vides for the right to file a proof of claim in section 501, and section 501 is
not among the judicial activities specifically enumerated in section 362(a).
The circuit court stated:
We find no precedents in which a court has held that asserting a right
to payment in a Proof of Claim constitutes a violation of the auto-
matic stay. In fact, a number of courts . . . have found that an auto-
matic stay has no effect on actions that are expressly allowed under
the Bankruptcy Code.76
70. Campbell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 545 F.3d 348, 350 (5th Cir. 2008).
71. Id. at 356-57.
72. Id. at 355-56.
73. Id. at 351.
74. Id. at 353-54.
75. Id. at 355-56.
76. Id. at 356.
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If a creditor files an incorrect or even absurd proof of claim, the Code
contains a remedy and an appropriate mechanism: an objection to the
claim. 77 This is exactly what happened in this case. Although the imme-
diate factual situation of this case appears narrow, it puts to rest the argu-
ment that relief from the automatic stay is necessary before a proceeding
or action is commenced in the bankruptcy court that would violate the
automatic stay if commenced in a different court.78
B. REPINE V. REPINE (IN RE REPINE)
The Fifth Circuit in In re Repine held that an award of punitive dam-
ages for a violation of the automatic stay under section 362(k) requires
egregious conduct on the part of the violator.79
Young, an attorney, represented the debtor's ex-wife in a child support
enforcement action. Pre-petition, the debtor was incarcerated for his fail-
ure to pay child support. Young was awarded attorney's fees in the ac-
tion. The ex-wife filed a child support lien against the debtor's property
on the first day of his incarceration. During his incarceration, the debtor
filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy.80 His bankruptcy counsel soon thereafter
notified Young of the filing.
The debtor and his ex-wife ultimately resolved their child support issue,
and the bankruptcy court entered an order modifying the automatic stay
to implement that settlement.81 The family court denied the settlement
based on Young's argument that it did not guarantee that she would be
paid her fees under it and that the debtor should remain in prison until he
paid the child support.82 Young thereafter refused to agree to the
debtor's release from prison even upon the death of the debtor's father. 83
The debtor later filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court
against Young. That court found that Young willfully violated the auto-
matic stay, and it awarded actual damages against Young for lost wages,
emotional distress, and attorney's fees, as well as $5,000 in punitive dam-
ages. 84 The district court affirmed. 85 The Fifth Circuit considered several
issues, including whether Young violated the automatic stay, and found
that she had done so by attempting to collect her pre-petition claim for
attorney's fees.86
The issue of first impression for the Fifth Circuit, however, was the
requisite conduct necessary to support an award for punitive damages for
an automatic stay violation. It noted that the relevant statute provides
77. See id.
78. See id. at 356-57.
79. Repine v. Repine (In re Repine), 536 F.3d 512, 521 (5th Cir. 2008).
80. Id. at 515.
81. Id. at 516.
82. Id. at 516-17.
83. Id. at 517.
84. Id. at 517-18.
85. Id. at 518.
86. Id. at 518-20.
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that the court may award punitive damages in "appropriate circum-
stances."'87 Without detailed analysis, the Fifth Circuit adopted the "egre-
gious conduct" standard: only conduct that is egregious will give rise to
punitive damages for an automatic stay violation under section 362(k).88
In agreeing that Young's actions rose to this level, the circuit court af-
firmed the award of punitive damages against her:
Young ignored ...warnings that efforts to collect her fees would
violate the automatic stay, ignored [the debtor's ex-wife's] wishes
that Repine be released from jail, failed to appear before the Bank-
ruptcy Court despite being ordered to do so, and persisted in her
efforts to collect her fees despite the Bankruptcy Court's admonish-
ment that she cease all collection efforts. This conduct was
egregious.8 9
In re Repine provides important clarity to Texas courts with respect to
the legal standard necessary to impose punitive damages for a stay viola-
tion. At the same time, however, the "egregious conduct" standard is
somewhat vague and fact-specific. The decision fails to address the ap-
propriateness of punitive damages for a stay violation under anything
other than section 362(k) of the Code, such as under section 105(a) of the
Code. The circuit court also failed to clarify the requisite level of conduct
needed for the imposition of punitive damages under such other provi-
sions, although it is likely and logical that the "egregious conduct" stan-
dard would apply (if punitive damages are available under such other
provisions).
C. IN RE MD PROMENADE, INC.
The bankruptcy court in In re MD Promenade, Inc., examined a credi-
tor's standing to assert a cause of action for violation of the automatic
stay.90 Before the petition date, the debtor agreed to vacate certain
leased premises in the course of state court litigation. Post-petition, the
debtor's principals and a secured creditor removed property from the
leased premises in a highly destructive manner. The lease was subse-
quently rejected, but no relief from the automatic stay was granted. 91
The landlord subsequently moved for damages for the violation of the
automatic stay and for contempt. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Texas found that the debtor's principals and others
willfully violated the automatic stay by exercising control over property
of the estate.92 However, certain of the property removed from the
premises belonged to the landlord under the lease, the stay was willfully
and intentionally violated only with respect to the property which be-
87. Id. at 521 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (2006)).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. In re MD Promenade, Inc., No. 08-34113-SGJ-7, 2009 WL 80203, at *6-7 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2009).
91. Id. at *1.
92. Id. at *6-7.
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longed to the estate. 93
In determining whether the landlord had standing to seek damages for
the stay violation, the court recognized that the secured creditor and the
debtor were both controlled by, or related to, the debtor's principals,
who, having violated the automatic stay, would have no motivation to
seek redress for the stay violation. 94 Such facts were not a prerequisite to
seek redress for a stay violation, but the court noted that such factors
were part of the reason individual creditors had been found to have
standing and why section 363(k) of the Code spoke in broad terms (em-
ploying the phrase "individual," as opposed to "debtor" or "trustee"). 95
The court pointed out that "[t]he Fifth Circuit described one of the
beneficial effects of the automatic stay is that it halts the traditional 'race
to the courthouse' by creditors seeking to collect on debts. '96 The court
cited several opinions for the proposition that individual creditors had
standing under section 362(h) of the Code (now section 362(k)). 97 How-
ever, because the creditor in In re MD Promenade, Inc. was not an "indi-
vidual," as is required by section 362(k) of the Code, that statutory
provision was unavailable for the requested damages. Instead, the court
held that damages for the stay violation were available under section
105(a) of the Code and pursuant to the court's powers to remedy con-
tempt.98 As explained by the court, "[s]uch an action does not merely
assert a third party's rights or a generalized grievance but, rather, seeks to
punish an act which does violence to the essential fabric of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, and which has resulted in particularized harm to the com-
plaining creditor." 99 The court accordingly awarded the trustee, for the
estate, contempt damages in the amount of $250,000.100
VI. CHAPTER 11 PLANS
A. ELIXIR INDUSTRIES INC. V. CITY BANK & TRUST CO.
(IN RE AHERN ENTERPRISES INC.)
Elixir, a judgment creditor with a judgment lien against real property,
filed a proof of claim in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case and failed to
object to the confirmation of the plan.10 1 The plan referenced the prop-
93. Id.
94. Id. at *1, *11.
95. See id. at *11-12.
96. Id. at *10 (quoting GATX Aircraft Corp. v. M/V Courtney Leigh, 768 F.2d 711,
716 (5th Cir. 1985)). The automatic stay protects the Code's policy of the equality of credi-
tors, and creditors have standing to ensure that this protection is enforced.
97. Id. (citing In re Int'l Forex of Cal., Inc., 247 B.R. 284, 290-91 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
2000); In re Bequette, 184 B.R. 327, 332 (Bankr. S.D. I11. 1995)).
98. Id. at *12.
99. Id. at *11 (quoting Barnett Bank of S.E. Ga., N.A. v. Trust Co. Bank of S.E. Ga.,
N.A. (In re Ring), 178 B.R. 570, 577 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1995)).
100. Id. at *16. Sanctions were awarded to the estate instead of directly to the com-
plaining creditor since it was the estate that was injured by the stay violation.
101. Elixir Indus. Inc. v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ahern Enters. Inc.), 507 F.3d 817,
818-19 (5th Cir. 2007).
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erty subject to the lien and preserved a senior secured lender's lien
against the property, but failed to mention the judgment creditor's lien.
The case was converted to Chapter 7 after the plan's confirmation.10 2
The Fifth Circuit examined whether the confirmation of the plan under
these circumstances transferred the subject property "free and clear" and
voided the judgment creditor's lien; the court held that the confirmation
of the plan did indeed void the judgment lien.10 3
The circuit court stated,
[flour conditions must... be met for a lien to be voided under sec-
tion 1141(c): (1) the plan must be confirmed; (2) the property that is
subject to the lien must be dealt with by the plan; (3) the lien holder
must participate in the reorganization; and (4) the plan must not pre-
serve the lien. 10
4
The judgment creditor in this case filed a proof of claim and participated
in the bankruptcy case, but failed to object to the confirmation of the
plan. The Fifth Circuit found that the filing of the proof of claim by the
judgment creditor constituted sufficient participation in the bankruptcy
case.
1 05
The plan itself dealt with the subject property, providing that the senior
secured lender would retain its lien against the property. 10 6 In this re-
spect, the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that the voided lien must
itself be dealt with in the plan, it being sufficient that the property, and
not the lien, is treated in the plan.1 0 7 The circuit court held that unless
the plan explicitly provides for the preservation of the lien, the transfer is
free and clear of the lien under section 1141(c) of the Code regardless of
the use of the "free and clear" language.1 08
The final and perhaps most important argument addressed by the cir-
cuit court was whether the confirmed plan needed to be substantially con-
summated prior to the avoidance of the judgment lien. It held: "we
conclude that regardless of how the term 'consummation' is inter-
preted ... Elixir's lien was voided upon confirmation of the plan."'10 9 It
therefore did not matter that the plan did not reach "substantial consum-
mation" or that the case was converted to Chapter 7 shortly after the
confirmation of the plan:
The language of section 1141(c) similarly provides that the property
dealt with by the plan.., is free and clear after confirmation. Even if
Elixir's interpretation of the plan is correct, and the plan did not take
102. Id. at 819.
103. Id. at 818, 824-25.
104. Id. at 822.
105. Id. at 823.
106. Id. at 824. The plan therefore mentioned the subject property and addressed the
preservation of another creditor's lien against the property.
107. Id. at 823 ("[A] requirement that the lien itself be dealt with by the plan is not a
sensible reading of section 1141(c).").
108. Id. at 823-24.
109. Id. at 825 (emphasis added).
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effect until the Consummation Date, its lien was void after confirma-
tion of the plan, by operation of § 1141(c), unless the plan specifi-
cally provides otherwise. 10
VII. CORE/NON-CORE PROCEEDINGS
A. BEITEL V. OCA, INC. (IN RE OCA, INC.)
The Fifth Circuit has frequently analyzed the legal standard applying to
a "core proceeding." In most non-core proceedings, a defendant may
consent to the bankruptcy court's entry of final orders under 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(c)(2), which the Fifth Circuit refers to as the bankruptcy court exer-
cising full adjudicatory powers. The defendant in In re OCA, Inc. was
sued in an adversary proceeding but failed to file an answer after being
properly served and received a default judgment.' The issue before the
Fifth Circuit, which held that the proceeding against the defendant was
non-core,112 was whether the bankruptcy court could enter a final default
judgment notwithstanding the non-core nature of the proceeding." 3
The circuit court concluded that the bankruptcy court could indeed is-
sue the final default judgment based on the defendant's "implied[ ] con-
sent[ ] to the bankruptcy court's entry of final orders and judgments."" 4
It recognized that the consent to the bankruptcy court's entry of final
orders in non-core proceedings "may be express or implied '11 5 and that
the "[flailure to object in the bankruptcy court may constitute implied
consent."1 16 Here, the defendant could have objected to the bankruptcy
court's exercise of core jurisdiction by answering the complaint. Moreo-
ver, the defendant admitted in a motion to set aside the default judgment
that the proceeding was "core." 117 The circuit court observed that the
defendant's action "more closely resembles an afterthought than a bona
fide objection."118
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the defendant had failed
to timely object to the exercise of core jurisdiction and that his post-de-
fault judgment admission that the jurisdiction was core sufficed, notwith-
standing his subsequent arguments to the contrary.11 9 Unlike subject
matter jurisdiction, the core/non-core issue could be and was waived. De-
fault judgment by the bankruptcy court was therefore appropriate 120 even
110. Id.
111. Beitel v. OCA, Inc. (In re OCA, Inc.), 551 F.3d 359, 364-65 (5th Cir. 2008).
112. Id. at 368.
113. See id. at 367.
114. Id. at 368.
115. Id. (citing M.A. Baheth & Co. v. Schott (In re M.A. Baheth Constr. Co.), 118 F.3d
1082, 1084 (5th Cir. 1997)).
116. Id. (citing McFarland v. Leyh (In re Tex. Gen. Petrol. Corp.), 52 F.3d 1330, 1337
(5th Cir. 1995)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 369 (internal quotation omitted).
119. Id. at 368.




though the proceeding was non-core.1 21
VIII. CREDITORS MEETING
A. PERES V. SHERMAN (IN RE PERES)
The conclusion of the meeting of creditors is important for several
deadlines under the Code and the Bankruptcy Rules, particularly in con-
sumer bankruptcy cases. In In re Peres, the meeting of creditors was con-
tinued three times. 122 At the time of the final continuance, the Chapter 7
trustee did not announce a date for its continuance. 123 The meeting was
subsequently rescheduled, and then continued again. The debtors argued
that the trustee's later objections to exemptions were untimely, since the
third continuation of the meeting of creditors, with no formal notice of its
continuation date, meant that the meeting of creditors concluded as of
that date. 124
The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument and two "bright-line" ap-
proaches, holding that if a trustee does not announce a specific date to
which the meeting is being continued within thirty days of the last meet-
ing held, the meeting will be deemed to have been concluded on the "last
date it was convened. '125 The circuit court also rejected an alternative
bright-line rule, disagreeing that "a meeting of creditors is not concluded
until such time as the trustee so declares or the court so orders."'1 26 Such
an approach conflicts with the Code's strong policy of promptness, and
either rule could impede the interests of justice in complex cases or in
cases requiring additional review and discovery. 127
The circuit court instead adopted a case-by-case approach, applying "at
least four factors in determining the reasonableness of a trustee's delay in
adjourning a meeting of creditors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the
complexity of the estate; (3) the cooperativeness of the debtor; and (4)
the existence of any ambiguity regarding whether the trustee continued
or concluded the meeting."'1 28 In In re Peres, the trustee acted reasonably
in continuing the meeting of creditors several times. 129 Additionally, the
circuit concluded that the continuation of the meeting did not require
written notice, unlike the date of the initial meeting.130 Given these con-
siderations, and the fact that there was no ambiguity concerning the ad-
journment of the meeting as opposed to its conclusion (the transcript
121. Id.
122. In re Peres, 530 F.3d 375, 376 (5th Cir. 2008).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 377.
126. Id. at 378.
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. The court granted the continuances for various reasons, including to give debtors
an opportunity to gather records and because of an unprecedented amount of BAPCPA-
related Chapter 7 filings in the court system at that time.
130. Id. at 378-79.
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clearly revealed that the meeting was "continued"), the trustee properly
continued the meeting of creditors and did not, in the process, conclude
the meeting.
IX. DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
A. BEITEL V. OCA INC. (IN RE OCA, INC.)
The Fifth Circuit in In re OCA, Inc., decided that there is no presump-
tion that a failure to answer a complaint is willful and that the "prepon-
derance of the evidence," rather than the "clear and convincing,"
standard applies in the analysis.' 3 1 The bankruptcy court had issued a
default judgment. On appeal from the denial of a motion for new trial,
the circuit court articulated the factors for setting aside a default
judgment:
whether the default was willful, whether setting it aside would
prejudice the adversary, and whether a meritorious defense is
presented. Courts may also consider whether the public interest was
implicated, whether there was significant financial loss to the defen-
dant, and whether the defendant acted expeditiously to correct the
default. The district court need not consider all of the above factors
in ruling on a defendant's 60(b)(1) motion.132
The Fifth Circuit agreed that there was a presumption of valid service by
mail and that clear and convincing evidence is required for a finding that
proper mail service had not in fact been accomplished. 133 However, the
circuit court expressed concern that the bankruptcy court appeared to
apply such a presumption to the issue of willfulness as well.' 3 4
The Fifth Circuit rejected both this presumption and the application of
the clear and convincing standard. "If courts were to require clear and
convincing evidence to overcome a putative willfulness presumption, the
instruction to apply Rule 60(b) 'most liberally' when considering whether
to vacate a default judgment would be rendered meaningless. ' 135 Ac-
cordingly, "trial courts must apply only the preponderance-of-the-evi-
dence standard when assessing willfulness.' '1 36
X. DEEPENING INSOLVENCY
A. WOOLEY V. FAULKNER (IN RE SI RESTRUCTURING, INC.)
The Fifth Circuit in In re SI Restructuring, Inc. examined the second
element of equitable subordination, which requires harm to creditors. 37
The unsecured creditors' committee in this case denied that it based its
131. Beitel v. OCA, Inc. (In re OCA, Inc.), 551 F.3d 359, 372 (5th Cir. 2008).
132. Id. at 369.
133. See id. at 371.
134. See id. at 371-73.
135. Id. at 372.
136. Id.




argument for harm to creditors on a "deepening insolvency" theory, but
its expert acknowledged that he used such a theory to calculate dam-
ages. 138 The expert calculated that the debtor lost $3.5 million between
the time it made the loans in question and the petition date. He argued
that the loans caused the lost value because, absent the loans, the debtor
would have been forced to file bankruptcy sooner and there would have
been more value for distribution.' 39 The circuit court defined the theory
of deepening insolvency as "prolonging an insolvent corporation's life
through bad debt, causing the dissipation of corporate assets.' 140 In
dicta, the Fifth Circuit firmly rejected the deepening insolvency theory.14 1
Quoting the Delaware Court of Chancery, a leading authority on issues
of corporate management and liability, the circuit court stated:
Even when a firm is insolvent, its directors may, in the appropriate
exercise of their business judgment, take action that might, if it does
not pan out, result in the firm being painted in a deeper hue of red.
The fact that the residual claimants of the firm at that time are credi-
tors does not mean that the directors cannot choose to continue the
firm's operations in the hope that they can expand the inadequate
pie such that the firm's creditors get a greater recovery. By doing so,
the directors do not become a guarantor of success. 142
Given that the circuit court failed to rule directly on the issue, In re SI
Restructuring, Inc. does not fully settle the viability of the theory of deep-
ening insolvency. However, the circuit court's comment that it has "little
legal support" indicates that future litigants will have a difficult time con-
vincing a bankruptcy court that the Fifth Circuit would not reject the the-
ory. Perhaps a set of egregious facts could convince a court otherwise,
but then it is likely that such egregious facts would support different and
more traditional and accepted theories of liability or damages.
XI. EXEMPTIONS
A. SOZA v. HILL (IN RE SOZA)
The day before they filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition, the debtors in
In re Soza purchased a $30,000 annuity with non-exempt assets and listed
the annuity as exempt property pursuant to the Texas exemption stat-
utes. 143 The bankruptcy court sustained the objection to exemptions
138. Id. at 362-63.
139. See id. at 363.
140. Id.
141. Id. The Fifth Circuit found that the application of a deepening insolvency theory
was not warranted by the factual record, and it specifically noted that it did not consider
the legal viability of the deepening insolvency theory. Id. at 364. Although its comments
regarding the legal viability of the theory are therefore dicta, the strength of those com-
ments, and the very need for them in the opinion (or rather lack of such a need), are telling
as to the Fifth Circuit's ultimate view on this important issue.
142. Id. at 363-64 (quoting Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906
A.2d 168, 174 (Del. Ch. 2006) (rejecting deepening insolvency as theory of liability or
damages)).
143. Soza v. Hill (In re Soza), 542 F.3d 1060, 1063 (5th Cir. 2008).
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made by the trustee, but the district court reversed. The district court
disagreed with the bankruptcy court's conclusion that constructive fraud
sufficed to defeat the exemption, holding instead that actual fraud was
required.144
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's conclusion and stated that
actual fraud was not required to defeat the exemption.1 45 The operative
statutory language requires that the annuity purchase be made "in fraud
of a creditor" to except the annuity from the exemption. 146 The circuit
court found it significant that the Texas statute did not mention intent
and interpreted its omission to mean that something less than actual in-
tent would suffice.147 It concluded that it was likely that the Texas Su-
preme Court would hold that actual intent to defraud was unnecessary in
order to deny the exemption. 148
The circuit court observed that "Texas courts will have to determine
how much less than actual intent to defraud suffices to deny exemptions
for insurance policies and annuities under § 1108.053,' ' 1 4 9 and offered
that the "badges of fraud" factors governing fraudulent transfers and
other frauds might guide the inquiry.150 The Fifth Circuit found several
of these factors present in In re Soza, and concluded that the exemption
was properly denied as being in fraud of creditors. 151
B. WALLACE V. ROGERS (IN RE ROGERS)
The debtor inherited a 72-acre tract of real property in 1994.152 The
debtor later married and occupied separate real property with her hus-
band as their homestead. Thereafter, and within the 1,215-day period
under section 522(p)(1) of the Code, the debtor divorced her husband
and moved back to the inherited land, living on it as her homestead. The
debtor filed a Chapter 7 case and claimed the inherited land as her home-
stead with a value of $359,000.153 A judgment creditor objected to the
exemption, claiming that the debtor acquired her homestead interest
within 1,215 days of the petition date and that, accordingly, she could
only exempt $125,000 of the land's value.154
In this matter of first impression, the Fifth Circuit affirmed both lower
courts and overruled the judgment creditor's objection to exemption,
finding the section 522(p)(1) cap with respect to an "interest that was
acquired by the debtor during the 1,215-day period preceding the date of
144. Id. at 1064.
145. Id. at 1065-66, 1069.
146. Id. at 1065 (quoting TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1108.053(1) (Vernon 2007)).




151. Id. at 1067.





the filing of the petition" 155 did not apply.156 The circuit court examined
whether the "interest" at issue must be the homestead interest itself or
whether it excludes an ownership interest. In other words, does the cap
apply if the debtor owned the property prior to the look-back period but
only began using the property during the look-back period, such that the
homestead interest, as separate from the ownership interest, was acquired
during the look-back period?
The circuit court observed that "[a] homestead interest is not the
equivalent of title or equity."'1 57 Additionally, the debtor did not increase
her equity in the property during the look-back period by paying down
debt on the property, and she made improvements by using her exempt
retirement funds in an amount less than the section 522(p)(1) amount.
Although the property may have appreciated in value during the look-
back period, passive equity appreciation is not the acquisition of an inter-
est within the meaning of the statute. 158
Discussing the crux of the issue, the Fifth Circuit stated that the credi-
tor sought to expand the common view of an "interest" to include a
"homestead interest" instead of the more restrictive notion of a "prop-
erty interest":
Under Texas law, the homestead interest is a legal interest created by
the constitution that ... gives protective legal security rather than
vested economic rights. Although the Texas Supreme Court referred
to the homestead interest as a "legal interest" in Heggen, we must
look beyond that label and consider the substance of the right con-
ferred by state law. Based on our review of the statutory language,
we conclude that the term "interest" as used in § 522(p)(1) refers to
vested economic interests that the debtor acquires in the homestead
property during the 1,215-day period preceding the filing of the peti-
tion. Thus, a homestead interest established within the statutory pe-
riod, without more, does not fall within the purview of
§ 522(p)(1). 159
The homestead interest was therefore a legal interest but not a vested
economic interest that is applicable to a 522(p)(1) inquiry. For cap pur-
poses, the underlying economic interest must be acquired during the
look-back period. In In re Rogers, where the debtor did not make large
improvements or pay down liabilities against the property (although
those factors would not necessarily alter the holding), the fact that the
debtor acquired the economic interest in the property outside the look-
155. 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1) (2006).
156. Rogers, 513 F.3d at 227.
157. Id. at 222.
158. See id. Moreover, the divorce decree divested the husband of his interest in the
property. While there is some support for the proposition that an interest of a spouse may
be "acquired" through a divorce decree that divests the other spouse of a community inter-
est in the property, the property in this case was inherited and never became community
property. See id. at 222-23.
159. Id. at 224 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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back period insulated the exemption from the cap and rendered the en-
tire value of the property exempt.
XII. POST-PETITION ATTORNEY'S FEES
A. TRAVELERS CASUALTY & SURETY Co. OF AMERICA V.
PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
The issue of whether an unsecured creditor is entitled to an award of
attorney's fees for litigating bankruptcy disputes, when the same is based
on a pre-petition contract, often arises in bankruptcy proceedings. In
Travelers, the insurance company incurred attorney's fees related to vari-
ous matters in the debtor's Chapter 11 case, including the language of the
plan. 160 Asserting a right to recovery of the fees under its pre-petition
contract with the debtor, the insurance company sought its allowance as
part of its pre-petition claim. The bankruptcy court disallowed the claim
and held that the insurance company "could not recover attorney's fees
incurred while litigating issues of bankruptcy law."' 161 The court of ap-
peals affirmed based on the Fobian rule,162 holding that "attorney fees
are not recoverable in bankruptcy for litigating issues peculiar to federal
bankruptcy law because the fees incurred were related to issues governed
exclusively by federal bankruptcy law."1 63
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, observing that a creditor is
entitled to file a claim in the bankruptcy case and that the claim is to be
allowed unless it meets one of the disallowed categories provided by sec-
tion 502(b) of the Code.164 None of these categories specifically disallows
post-petition attorney's fees.165 A claim's disallowance may therefore
only be based on its "unenforceab[ility] against the debtor and property
of the debtor . . . for a reason other than because [it] is contingent or
unmatured. ' 166 The Court explained that non-bankruptcy law typically
governs the allowance of claims under this section of the Code and that
attorney's fees are allowed under the non-bankruptcy law applicable to
the situation.1 67
The Court rejected the Fobian rule as judge-made law that finds no
support in the Code: "[t]he absence of textual support is fatal for the
Fobian rule. Consistent with our prior statements regarding creditors' en-
titlements in bankruptcy, we generally presume that claims enforceable
under applicable state law will be allowed in bankruptcy unless they are
expressly disallowed. 1 68 Critically, the Court specifically refused to ad-
160. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 445-47
(2007).
161. Id. at 447.
162. See Fobian v. W. Farm Credit Bank (In re Fobian), 951 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1991).
163. Travelers, 549 U.S. at 447-48 (internal quotations omitted).
164. Id. at 449-50.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 450 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (2006)).
167. See id.
168. Id. at 452 (internal citations omitted).
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dress the applicability and meaning of section 506(b) of the Code, which
generally provides for post-petition attorney's fees to the extent that a
secured claim is oversecured. 169 The issue had not already been raised
and the Court refused to address it for the first time on appeal, leaving
unresolved the ultimate allowance of post-petition attorney's fees for un-
secured claims. 170 Travelers only stands for the proposition that contract-
based attorney's fees as an unsecured claim under section 502(b) of the
Code are not automatically disallowable merely because they are in-
curred while litigating issues under the Code. The more important ques-
tions-whether the allowance of such fees will survive a challenge under
section 506(b) of the Code, and the type of priority that they may be
entitled to-remain unanswered.
XIII. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
A. REED V. RABE (IN RE GROTJOHN)
In re Grotjohn is unreported and involves a unique fact pattern; never-
theless, it is included in this article because it affirms the two published
opinions of the courts below. 7 1 The debtor owned, but failed to sched-
ule, certain affirmative causes of action pre-petition. He continued pros-
ecuting those causes of action post-petition and retained counsel to
represent him. To raise the necessary funds, the debtor executed an as-
signment of a one-third interest in the lawsuit to a friend, who then paid
tens of thousands of dollars both to the debtor for the law firm and di-
rectly to the law firm. 172 The trustee learned of the state court lawsuit,
reopened the case, and defeated the debtor's attempt to exempt the state
court lawsuit. In the meantime, the state court jury issued a take-nothing
verdict against the debtor. The trustee then sued the law firm to recover
the funds paid by the debtor's friend under the assignment, arguing that
such funds were property of the estate.1 7 3
The Fifth Circuit analyzed the assignment agreement between the
debtor and his friend to determine if it constituted a "transfer" of prop-
erty of the estate as defined in the Code. The circuit court agreed that
absent an abandonment, only a trustee, and not a Chapter 7 debtor, may
lawfully transfer property of the estate.' 7 4 Therefore, the purported as-
signment was a nullity. In determining whether the proceeds of the as-
signment were property of the estate as the "proceeds" of property of the
estate-which represented the crux of the trustee's argument to avoid
and recover the funds in question-the circuit court concluded that:
the Debtor never had the legal power or authority to transfer the
legal claims at issue, which were the property of the estate. There-
169. See id. at 454-55.
170. See id. at 455.
171. Reed v. Rabe (In re Grotjohn), 289 F. App'x 702, 703 (5th Cir. 2008).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 703-04.
174. Id. at 705.
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fore, no transfer of estate property occurred, so the Transferred
Money could not have been, and was not, "proceeds ... of or from
property of the estate" under § 541(a)(6).175
The Fifth Circuit, therefore, affirmed both lower courts and held that
the trustee could not recover the funds paid to the law firm because those
funds never constituted property of the estate. 176 This holding is impor-
tant for two principle reasons, despite the limited nature of the factual
scenario before the court: (1) the Fifth Circuit confirmed that the debtor
has no legal ability to transfer property of the estate and that an attempt
to do so through a document (as opposed to a physical disposition) is
therefore a nullity; and (2) it confirmed that there can be no "proceeds"
of property of the estate without a "transfer" of property of the estate in
the first instance.
B. HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LP V. CHESAPEAKE ENERGY
CORP. (IN RE SEVEN SEAS PETROLEUM, INC.)
This case builds upon the Fifth Circuit's important jurisprudence that
distinguishes which causes of action constitute property of the estate. 177
In re Seven Seas Petroleum, Inc. continues the long line of cases that in-
cludes S.L Acquisitions178 and MortgageAmerical7 9 by addressing
whether the injuries caused by one creditor to another were property of
the estate.
In In re Seven Seas Petroleum, Inc., certain entities purchased a large
amount of the secured notes of the debtor, Seven Seas, on the open mar-
ket, relying, in part, on petroleum reserves estimates filed by the debtor
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 180 Many of the secured
notes were held by Seven Seas insiders. After an involuntary bankruptcy
and the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee, the trustee filed suit against
the secured lenders to recharacterize a portion of their debt. The trustee
filed affirmative fraud claims against Chesapeake, a holder of the secured
notes, and the other secured noteholders, alleging breaches of duty and
interference with management's duties.18 1 The trustee later dropped the
tort claims against Chesapeake; ultimately, the trustee and Chesapeake
settled, and Chesapeake released some collateral in exchange for a full
release by the estate.1 8 2 The settlement was part of the Chapter 11 plan
confirmed by the bankruptcy court, and upon its confirmation, Chesa-
175. Id. at 705-06.
176. See id.
177. See Highland Capital Mgmt. LP v. Chesapeake Energy Corp. (In re Seven Seas
Petrol., Inc.), 522 F.3d 575, 578 (5th Cir. 2008).
178. S.I. Acquisition, Inc. v. Eastway Delivery Serv., Inc. (In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc.),
817 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1987).
179. Am. Nat'l Bank of Austin v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica
Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1983).
180. See In re Seven Seas Petrol., 522 F.3d at 578.
181. Id. at 579.
182. Id. at 580.
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peake was dismissed with prejudice from the trustee's sUit.183
Pre-petition, the secured noteholders filed a state court action against
the party that prepared the petroleum reserves estimates. Post-confirma-
tion, the secured noteholders amended their state court petition to assert
claims against Chesapeake, "bringing claims of conspiracy to defraud and
aiding and abetting fraud. ' 184 The petition alleged that Chesapeake and
Seven Seas conspired to commit fraud and that Chesapeake aided and
abetted breaches of fiduciary duty by the debtor. Chesapeake then re-
moved the state court suit to bankruptcy court, arguing that bankruptcy
jurisdiction existed because the claims at issue were property of the es-
tate, and that such claims were released in the confirmed plan.185
Reviewing its prior precedent, the Fifth Circuit noted that "[ijf a claim
belongs to the estate, then the bankruptcy trustee has exclusive standing
to assert it. However, the trustee has no right to bring claims that belong
solely to the estate's creditors. ' 186 "Whether a particular state-law claim
belongs to the bankruptcy estate depends on whether under applicable
state law the debtor could have raised the claim as of the commencement
of the case."1 87 Thus, "[i]f a cause of action alleges only indirect harm to
a creditor (i.e., an injury which derives from harm to the debtor), and the
debtor could have raised a claim for its direct injury under the applicable
law, then the cause of action belongs to the estate. '188
Applying these principles, the circuit court concluded that the causes of
action at bar were not property of the estate because they alleged individ-
ualized injury in the form of fraud committed against the secured note-
holders. 189 The noteholders alleged injuries suffered by them as a result
of Seven Seas Petroleum's alleged misrepresentations and conspiracy
with others. As the issue was whether the debtor could have brought the
claim, the court found it unlikely, if not impossible, that the debtor could
have brought a claim essentially against itself for its own misrepresenta-
tions on which it could not have relied by definition. 190 As the circuit
court explained:
Here the underlying wrong is fraud in connection with the purchase
of bonds in the secondary market, and Seven Seas would not have
been in a position to assert the bondholders' reliance on any alleged
misrepresentations, or to claim to have suffered damages on account
of such reliance, as would be necessary to state a claim based on the
particular fraud that the bondholders complain of. The same is true
for the aiding and abetting fraud claim.' 91
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 581.
186. Id. at 584 (internal citation omitted).
187. Id.
188. Id. (quoting Schertz-Cibolo-Universal City v. Wright (In re Educators Group
Health Trust), 25 F.3d 1281, 1284 (5th Cir. 1994)).
189. See id. at 585-86.
190. Id. at 585-86, 588.
191. Id. at 586 (internal citation omitted).
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Of additional importance, the Fifth Circuit noted that: "[w]e also wish
to dispel any notion that a claim belongs to the estate or is otherwise only
assertable by the trustee merely because it could be brought by a number
of creditors, instead of just one."'192 The issue was not whether more than
one creditor could have brought the claim, but rather whether the debtor
itself could have brought the claim. This is an important distinction and
one which may have broader implications.
Ultimately, In re Seven Seas Petroleum, Inc. is an important decision
not because it changes the analysis of what causes of action constitute
property of the estate, as the Fifth Circuit reiterated and applied its prior
precedent on this issue. Rather, it is significant for the manner in which it
addresses alleged claims by one group of creditors against another and in
the analysis of the debtor's role in those claims. It is also significant for
the close inspection and reliance it gives to the precise language of the
petition, and therefore the alleged injury, as pled by the plaintiff. In
short, through careful and narrow pleading, a plaintiff may be able to
state a sufficiently particularized injury so as to make the claim not prop-
erty of the estate, assuming, of course, that the claim as so pleaded could
survive.
XIV. SANCTIONS-RULE 11
A. THE CADLE Co. v. PRATT (IN RE PRATT)
Bankruptcy Rule 9011 provides that a motion for sanctions regarding a
challenged pleading may not be presented to the court unless, within
twenty-one days of service of the motion, the challenged paper is not
withdrawn. 193 After an adverse ruling, the creditor in In re Pratt learned
that certain information elicited from the debtor by the debtor's attorney
may have been false. 194 For unexplained reasons, the creditor sought
sanctions from the debtor's attorney under Bankruptcy Rule 9011. The
bankruptcy court denied the motion for sanctions because, among other
things, the creditor failed to comply with the twenty-one day notice provi-
sion of the rule.1 95
The Fifth Circuit observed that it was undisputed that the creditor
failed to transmit the motion to the debtor's attorney at least twenty-one
days prior to filing the motion with the bankruptcy court. However, the
creditor argued that it complied with the mandatory notice requirement
by sending warning letters to the attorney, thereby informing the attorney
of the possibility that the creditor would seek sanctions and allowing the
attorney to change his pleadings prior to filing the motion.196
The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument.' 97 The circuit noted that, al-
192. Id. at 588.
193. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(c)(1)(A).
194. The Cadle Co. v. Pratt (In re Pratt), 524 F.3d 580, 583 (5th Cir. 2008).
195. Id.




though the issue of informal notice under the rule (or its equivalent in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) was a matter of first impression, other
circuit courts had rejected similar informal notice arguments. 198 The cir-
cuit also considered the plain language of the rule and noted that it has
consistently required "strict compliance" with the rule.199 The strict com-
pliance required to obtain relief under the rule is rooted in: (1) the poten-
tially severe nature of the rule; and (2) safe harbor provisions of the rule,
which are designed to protect litigants wherever possible in order to miti-
gate Rule 9011's potentially chilling effect.200
Accordingly, informal notice will not suffice under Rule 9011: a party
seeking sanctions for a sanctionable position must provide the offending
party at least twenty-one days notice and an opportunity to cure the sanc-
tionable conduct prior to filing the motion.201 Since one cannot provide
notice of a filed motion without filing the motion, but may not file the
motion until the requisite period has expired, the best practice is to send
the offending party a complete, but un-filed, draft of the motion.
B. IN RE SUGAR HILL RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT, INC.
This case 202 does not present any new point of law and is not likely to
be cited as precedent, even if published.20 3 However, it is worth mention,
as it demonstrates what can happen when an attorney hurriedly files a
petition for tactical gain, and then allegedly ignores the case when the
tactical gain is lost. It should serve as a reminder to attorneys of the
increasing level of scrutiny being shown by some courts, and of attorneys'
continuing duties in bankruptcy cases they file.
In order to forestall a state foreclosure of millions of dollars of unim-
proved real property, the attorney filed a Chapter 11 petition the day
before the scheduled foreclosure. 204 However, the attorney filed the peti-
tion for the general partner, which did not own the land. The creditor,
realizing that the automatic stay did not apply to non-estate property,
continued the foreclosure proceedings. The attorney's failure to comply
with certain requirements prompted a closer review by the United States
Trustee and the court.
The court found that the bankruptcy petition was not filed in good faith
but instead in order to delay the foreclosure. 205 This finding is potentially
significant, since many cases are filed under these circumstances. The
court further found that the attorney knew or should have known that the
198. Id. at 586-87.
199. Id. at 588.
200. See id. at 586-87.
201. See id. at 588.
202. In re Sugar Hill Residential Dev., Inc., No. 08-31459 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 3,
2008) (order imposing sanctions and referring counsel to District Court and to State Bar of
Texas).
203. The case is currently on appeal.




debtor did not own the land, and that the attorney instead scheduled the
land as an asset of the estate in order to mislead the court and the fore-
closing creditor.20 6 The attorney filed for the incorrect entity because his
ownership in the correct entity would have precluded his representation
of the limited partnership. Ultimately, the court sanctioned the attorney
$15,000 and referred the attorney to the State Bar of Texas and to the
district court for disciplinary action.207
206. Id. at 8-9.
207. Id. at 12-13.
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